Abstract. Previous work on program obfuscation gives strong negative results for general-purpose obfuscators, and positive results for obfuscating simple functions such as equality testing (point functions). In this work, we construct an obfuscator for a more complex algebraic functionality: testing for membership in a hyperplane (of constant dimension). We prove the security of the obfuscator under a new strong variant of the Decisional Die-Hellman assumption. Finally, we show a cryptographic application of the new obfuscator to digital signatures.
Introduction
The problem of program obfuscation has been of long-standing interest to practitioners, and has recently been an active topic of research in theoretical cryptography. The high-level goal of program obfuscation is to compile a computer program in such a way that an adversary cannot learn anything from seeing the program beyond could be learned by running the program and observing its input-output behavior.
Barak et al. [1] formalized the notion of obfuscation using simulation-based denitions. Over the past decade, the theory community has found a few positive obfuscation results for specic families of programs. In this paper, we provide an obfuscator for a new family of programs.
Virtual black-box obfuscation. The procedure of obfuscating a computer program should garble the program's code and make it unintelligible. The extent of the garbling is limited by the fact that the program's functionality should be preserved. As a result, both honest and adversarial users of the obfuscated program can learn some information by observing the program's input-output functionality, and we do not wish to prevent users from learning information this way. Instead, obfuscation ensures that this is the only way that an adversary can learn information from the obfuscated program.
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There are several ways to formalize this intuitive notion [2, 3, 4] . This paper uses the virtual black-box formalization of [1] . A signicant obstacle to obtaining positive results with respect to this denition is that the security notion must hold for all programs in a given family, and not just a random instance. This is one reason why standard cryptographic tools and analytical techniques (which usually deal with randomly chosen instances) are not always helpful for obfuscation.
Previous results. Several works have disproved the existence of a generalpurpose obfuscator that can simultaneously obfuscate every program [1, 2, 5] . In fact, these papers demonstrate specic programs that cannot be obfuscated, and these programs come from a relatively low complexity class. While these negative results are disheartening, they focus on specic (often contrived) functionalities.
Obfuscation remains possible for many programs of interest.
Still, very few positive results are known even for specic, simple programs (or boolean circuits). One family of programs for which positive results are known is the family of point circuits: password-checking programs that accept a single input string and reject all other inputs. This family can be obfuscated under a variety of cryptographic assumptions [6, 7, 8, 9] . Some of these constructions can be generalized in two ways. First, we can obfuscate multi-point circuits, which accept a polynomially-sized list of input strings, and second, we can obfuscate point circuits with multi-bit output, which store a hidden output string that is revealed only for a single input value [10] . Other formalizations of program obfuscation [3, 4] allow for the obfuscation of cryptographic tasks such as checking proximity to a hidden point [11] , vote mixing [12] , and re-encryption [4] . The latter two applications use a dierent security guarantee that only holds over a random choice of the circuit from the family.
Our result. In this paper, we obfuscate programs that perform hyperplane membership testing. Let P be a hyperplane in a vector space, and let H P be a program that tests whether its input is a point on the hyperplane. An obfuscation of H P allows a user to determine whether her input point is on the hyperplane, but reveals no additional information such as the distance from her point to the hyperplane or any other points that are on the hyperplane.
More precisely, given a prime p and positive integer d, consider the family of hyperplanes through the origin in the vector space ( We construct an obfuscator for this family of programs.
This primitive subsumes many of the previously-known results. In the d = 2
case, these hyperplanes turn out to be equivalent to point circuits, and our specic construction and assumption reduce to those in [6] . Furthermore, the technique of [10] can be applied to our primitive as well, so we can obfuscate the family of circuits that output a hidden message when its input is on the hyperplane.
Application to digital signatures. As an example of the proposed primitive's usefulness, we demonstrate an application of our obfuscator to leakage-resilient one-time signatures. We emphasize, though, that the main motivation for this work is the new obfuscator, rather than any single application.
The signature scheme is constructed as follows: the secret key is a randomly chosen plane in 3-dimensional space, and the public key is the obfuscated membership program. To sign a message m, nd a point on the plane that is related to m. This signature can be veried by running the public obfuscated program.
This signature scheme satises a weaker form of the unforgeability game, where the adversary is required to submit a message m to be signed before receiving the public key. Techniques from [13] 
and checking whether this equals G's identity element (i.e. whether a, x = 0).
Our assumption. We are not able to prove the security of our construction based on the standard Decisional Die-Hellman assumption, which states that g ab is indistinguishable from uniform, given g, g a , and g b for uniformly-chosen exponents a and b. We describe the diculty with basing our scheme on DDH, as it motivates and claries our new assumption.
For our construction, it is crucial that the adversary not be able to compute any polynomial relationships in the exponent (not just quadratic ones Organization. Section 2 denes virtual black-box obfuscation and the hyperplane membership testing programs. Section 3 describes our assumption in detail and compares it to previous assumptions. Section 4 presents our obfuscator for the family of hyperplanes and proves its security. Section 5 extends our construction to the multi-bit setting. Section 6 presents our one-time signature scheme.
Some of the proofs are relegated to the full version of this paper [15] .
Denitions 2.1 Virtual black-box obfuscation
In [1] , [5] , and other works, an obfuscator is dened as a compiler that takes a circuit as input and returns another circuit. The output circuit should be a garbled version of the input circuit, in the sense that the circuits should have the same functionality, but it should be dicult for an adversary to learn information from the output circuit.
Consider an imaginary world in which people can give others access to oracles at will. In this imaginary world, we can easily perform perfect obfuscation by giving users oracle access to a computer program. The oracle allows them to learn the program's input-output functionality, but any other aspect of the program's behavior is hidden from the users. Unfortunately, in the real world we cannot hand out oracles to other people. Instead, we want obfuscators to be able to replicate the power of oracles in the imaginary world. The formalization of obfuscation provided by Barak et al. [1] , called the virtual black-box property, achieves this goal.
The virtual black-box property considers two dierent worlds. In the real world, an ecient adversary has access to the obfuscated program code and attempts to learn a one bit predicate about the underlying program. The denition ensures that there exists a simulator in imaginary world that only interacts with an oracle to the program but can still can learn the same predicate that the adversary learns in the real world. Hence, the virtual black-box property ensures that access to the code of an obfuscated program is no more useful than access to the oracle.
We only require that the obfuscator operate over a specied family of circuits.
Throughout this work, all circuits are assumed to be non-uniform.
Denition 1 (Obfuscation). Let C = {C n } n∈N be a family of polynomial-size circuits, where C n denotes all circuits of input length n. A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm O is an obfuscator for the family C if the following three conditions are met.
1. Approximate functionality: There exists a negligible function ε such that for every n, every circuit C ∈ C n and every x in the input space of C,
where the probability is over the randomness of O. If this probability always equals 1, then we say that O has exact functionality. 2. Polynomial slowdown: There exists a polynomial q such that for every n, every circuit C ∈ C n , and every possible sequence of coin tosses for O, the circuit O(C) runs in time at most q(|C|). 3. Virtual black-box: For every PPT adversary A and polynomial δ, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all suciently large n, and for all C ∈ C n ,
where the rst probability is taken over the coin tosses of A and O, and the second probability is taken over the coin tosses of S.
Vector spaces
In this section, we dene the vector spaces over which our constructions operate. 
We caution that F d p does not satisfy all of the axioms of an inner product space.
Nevertheless, the following theorem about inner product spaces, which we need in the proof of our main theorem, does hold over
Proof (sketch). We also note that the vector space F d p is a bit redundant for our needs. We wish to identify a hyperplane P with a vector x that is orthogonal to every vector in the hyperplane. However, the vector x is not unique: indeed, for any c ∈ F p \ 0, the vector cx is also orthogonal to every vector in P , so the normal vector to the hyperplane is only unique up to scalar multiplication. As a result, we note that there are only d − 1 degrees of freedom when choosing a normal vector, which is why the d = 2 case corresponds to point functions. One canonical representation of the normal vector, which we will use when convenient throughout the paper, is to consider all of the vectors in F d p whose rst non-zero coordinate equals 1.
3 Our assumption
In this section, we dene the main assumption. Then, we relate our assumption to a DDH variant found in [6] and consider the assumption in the generic group model.
Our assumption uses groups of increasing prime order. We use the following denition to encapsulate the order requirement.
Denition 4. A function ρ(n) is called a prime sequence if for every n ∈ N, ρ(n) is a prime number in the range (2
Our assumption is parametrized by d ∈ N. We abuse notation a bit and denote
Assumption 5. Given d ∈ N, there exists a family of groups G = {G n } n∈N (written multiplicatively) such that the following three conditions hold:
1. There are ecient algorithms to perform the group operation, to test for equality with the identity element, and to sample uniformly from G. 2. The orders of the groups form a prime sequence ρ(n) = |G n |.
For every PPT adversary
In words, this assumption states that an adversary can distinguish two distributions of vectors if and only if linear tests can do so as well.
Discussion
We make several remarks:
1. The right-hand side of (1) depends on ρ but not on any other property of G.
2. Note that the adversary is allowed to distinguish L and R better than any single linear test does. For example, the adversary may try many linear tests.
The assumption merely states that the left-hand side of (1) is negligible whenever the right-hand side is.
For a given adversary A, we denote
and A L = Pr[l ← L n : A l ] for simplicity. We will say that L and R are indistinguishable by linear tests if
is a negligible function of n. Thus, the assumption states that for all L and R that are indistinguishable by linear tests, |A L − A R | is negligible as well for all PPT adversaries A.
4. This assumption is computationally falsiable, though perhaps ineciently.
There are two possible obstructions to eciency. First, the descriptions of L and R may be inecient, although this is not a problem for the distributions constructed in our proof. Second, it may not be ecient to determine which linear test performs the best. An interesting question is whether this computation can be performed eciently, leading to an ecient falsication procedure.
On the assumption's hardness
In this section, we categorize the hardness of our assumption. To begin with, we present a DDH-based assumption due to Canetti [6] .
Assumption 6. Let n be a security parameter and let p = 2q + 1 be a randomly chosen n-bit safe prime. Consider the group Q of squares in F * p . For any wellspread distribution ensemble {X q } where the domain of X q is F q , for g
c are computationally indistinguishable.
In this assumption, a well-spread ensemble means that the min-entropy H ∞ (X q ) is a super-logarithmic function of n.
The following theorem exemplies the strength of our assumption by relating it to Assumption 6, which is already considered by the cryptographic community to be quite strong.
Theorem 7. Assumption 6 implies Assumption 5 for dimension 2. For higher dimensions, our assumption may be stronger because Assumption 5 for dimension d + 1 implies Assumption 5 for dimension d.
On the other hand, we provide evidence that our assumption is feasible by showing that it holds in the generic group model. that sample L and R, respectively, to obtain the rst d components of the vector, and then sample the nal component uniformly over F ρ . We claim that linear tests do not distinguish L from R .
Any linear test x n ∈ F d+1 ρ(n)
that has a non-zero nal component will not distinguish L n from R n because the nal component of these two distributions is uniform, so the inner product will have the uniform distribution in both cases as well. Furthermore, if there exists a sequence of linear tests {x n } ∈ F Proof (Lemma 10). Suppose that Assumption 6 holds. For every n, the assumption holds for a randomly chosen safe prime p, and thus for every n there exists some safe prime p n = 2q n + 1 for which it holds. Let G n be the subgroup of quadratic residues in F * pn , and let G = {G n } n∈N . We claim that Assumption 5 for dimension 2 holds for the family G and prime sequence ρ(n) = q n .
It is clear that the rst two properties of Assumption 5 for dimension 2 hold.
Also, using our convention that the rst non-zero coordinate of a vector is xed to be 1, we may assume without loss of generality that every vector in F 2 ρ has the form (1, x) for x ∈ F qn except for the vector (0, 1), which is easy to test for.
Thus, a vector is really just a group element. Furthermore, a linear test is just an equality check because the vector (y, −1) has an inner product of zero with the vector (1, x) if and only if y = x.
Hence, it remains to prove the following: for every PPT adversary A and for all families of distributions L and R over {F qn } n∈N such that
is negligible as well.
First, we prove that the statement holds when L is well-spread and R is the uniform distribution. Hence, we wish to show that for all PPT A,
is negligible. The proof of this statement closely follows the proofs in [6] , so we only sketch the details here. If this statement is not true, then the probabil-
is noticeably dierent from the mean valuē P = A R for super-polynomially many values of x. Without loss of generality, there exist super-polynomially many values a for which P a is noticeably larger thanP . Let X qn be the uniform distribution over all such a. Then, the ensembles g, g a , g b , g c and g, g a , g b , g ab are distinguishable when a ← X qn by the adversary that runs A on the nal two components of the ensemble. In the rst case, the adversary outputs 1 with probabilityP , and in the second case, the adversary outputs 1 with noticeably higher probability. This contradicts Assumption 6.
Next, we note that the statement immediately extends to the setting where both L and R are well-spread by a simple hybrid argument. Finally, we consider arbitrarily distributions L and R such that
is negligible. In words, this equation means that for every x that occurs with noticeable probability in L, it occurs with the same probability in R as well up to a negligible dierence. Thus, the distributions L and R can only dier on outcomes that occur with negligible probability. Therefore, it suces to consider L and R that are well-spread, and in this case we showed that for every PPT A,
is negligible, so Assumption 5 for dimension 2 holds as desired.
We note that a literal converse to this lemma does not quite make sense because Assumption 6 is specic to the group of quadratic residues modulo F * p for a safe prime p, whereas Assumption 5 makes the more general claim that there exists some family of groups that satisfy a certain condition (potentially quite dierent from the groups used in Assumption 6).
Construction
In this section, we dene the family of programs that we obfuscate, present the obfuscator, and prove its security under Assumption 5.
Let d be an integer and ρ be a prime sequence. Given a vector a ∈ F d ρ(n) , let H a be the circuit that has a hardwired, and on input x ∈ F d ρ(n) , computes a, x in the obvious way and accepts if and only if the inner product equals 0. 
Output: circuit that has g1, . . . , g d hardwired, and on input a vector x, accepts if and only if
We stress that the generator g is not made public in addition to the g i . However, recall that the vector a is only dened uniquely up to scalar multiplication, and that one way to enforce this requirement is to assume that the rst non-zero coordinate of a equals 1. With this convention, the generator g is revealed.
This convention makes it clear that in the d = 2 case, this construction is the same as the one in [6] , and it can be based o the same DDH assumption by Theorem 7. Hence, our construction subsumes the one in [6] .
We note that in the work of Shen, Shi and Waters [16] on predicate privacy for inner product predicates in a predicate encryption scheme, their construction also tests whether an inner product is 0 by running it in the exponent of a group where CDH is hard. Otherwise the settings, constructions, and assumptions are quite dierent. In particular, a user who wants to check whether a vector x has inner product 0 with a hidden vector v needs to rst encrypt v using a secret key (so their predicate encryption scheme does not directly yield an obfuscation).
We now show that O G,d is an obfuscator, based on Assumption 5.
Theorem 11. Let d ∈ N and G be a set of groups satisfying Assumption 5.
Then, the algorithm O G,d is an obfuscator for the family F Using standard techniques found in [6] and other papers, we can show that the lemma implies that O G,d is an obfuscator.
Proof (Theorem 11 from Lemma 13). Let A be an adversary and ε be a polynomial, and we must construct a simulator S such that for every n ∈ N and every
.
By Lemma 13, there exists a polynomial s such that for every n ∈ N, there exists a set V ⊆ F Next, we provide some high-level intuition about why the lemma is true. Suppose there is an adversary A that breaks the obfuscation (and thus the lemma as well). We build a new adversary A * that runs A many times. Also, we construct two distributions L and R. These distributions will be uniform over their support, so we can really just think of them as sets. The construction of L and R proceeds iteratively, subject to two invariant conditions: rst, A * must be able to distinguish these distributions, and second, no linear test should do so. These constraints together violate Assumption 5.
We achieve the rst invariant using the negation of Lemma 13, which continually gives us a pair of vectors (l i , r i ) that A (and thus A * ) can distinguish.
We add l i to the support of L and r i to the support of R. well-spread, we ensure that all linear tests succeed with only negligible probability. The only downside to the proof is that the trapping procedure requires a simulator whose runtime is exponential in d, so the proof only holds for constant dimension.
The rest of this section is devoted to a formal proof of the lemma, which uses some techniques from the proofs in [6] , some novel proof concepts, and some linear algebra. We use the set notation [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k} in this proof.
values which we will denote by N ⊆ N. It follows from the above argument that as n → ∞, the sequence {c n } n∈N → ∞ as well. Hence, there exists an innitely large subset N ⊆ N such that {c n } n∈N is monotonically increasing. We form the families of distributions L and R such that L n and R n are uniform over the sets L cn n and R cn n , respectively, for all n ∈ N . We set L n = R n arbitrarily for all n / ∈ N . Consider the following unied adversary A * that is nonuniformly hardcoded with the values µ * cn = 1 2 (α * cn + β * cn ) for all n ∈ N (and arbitrarily values of µ * cn for n / ∈ N ).
Input: a vector v 1: set n ← |v 0 | 2: run A(O G,d (H v )) a total of 32n · ε(n) 2 times using fresh randomness for A
and O each time 3: let k denote the fraction of iterations that A accepts Output: L n if k ≤ µ * cn and R n otherwise This adversary will succeed at distinguishing L from R with overwhelming probability 1 − e −n for all n ∈ N (and of course the adversary will fail on all n / ∈ N ). On the other hand, any sequence of linear tests only succeeds with probability O( ε(n) n cn/d ) which is negligible since c n → ∞ as n → ∞. Hence, there is no polynomial q(n) that bounds the ratio of success probabilities for the innitely many n ∈ N , so Assumption 5 is false as desired.
sk, (cm, σ 2 , 1) = 0. The signature is (cm, σ 2 ).
Verify(m, (σ 1 , σ 2 )): Accept if and only if σ 1 = cm and P (σ 1 , σ 2 , 1) accepts.
This scheme is an existentially unforgeable one-time signature scheme in a weak sense, described in [13] and other works, in which the forger must choose the message on which she requests a signature before being shown the public key. The techniques in [13] allow us to transform this one-time signature scheme scheme into one that is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attacks (the standard security notion for signature schemes). The transformation requires a chameleon hash function whose seed can be chosen with public coins. It is known how to construct such hash function under the DDH assumption [18] .
Furthermore, our one-time signature scheme is resilient to any leakage function whose output length is less than half as long as the secret key.
Theorem 16. Let ρ be a prime sequence, and O be an obfuscator for the family of hyperplanes over the vector space F 3 ρ . Then, the above algorithm leads to a l(n)-resistant unforgeable one-time signature scheme for all l(n) = log(ρ(n)) − ω(log(n)) .
In particular, leakage of l(n) = γn for any γ < 1 is permitted.
This theorem is proved in [15] . We note that the leakage bound in the theorem is tight. Consider the following leakage function that has a message m hardcoded: use the secret key to form a signature σ associated to m, and output σ 2 . This leakage function has log(ρ(n)) bits of output, and permits a forgery of the message m by the signature (cm, σ 2 ).
The secret key consists of two elements of F ρ(n) , so it is 2n bits long. Thus, our signature scheme permits leakage of up to half of the length of the secret key. This matches the leakage bound attained in [14] for schemes that do not use general non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (albeit under a much stronger assumptions).
